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Abstract: 
The paper analyzes why after more than a decade China’s telecom service sector is not fully 
open. What prompted Government to allow FDI to come in a phased and geographically 
restricted manner. What kind of regulations Government has put in place to protect the interests 
of foreign investors. How this sector performed during the global financial crisis and what role 
FDI played in the sector. 
The findings suggest that it is handiwork of the Chinese Government to retain the sector as 
restricted. It allowed limited FDI to come and geographically available to consumers to gauze 
the initial impact, and keep it an extremely urbanized affair. Ideological reasons also played a 
role in restricting FDI in telecom services and allowed the sector to move quite cautiously. On 
the whole, State control of communications network and allowing or disallowing of FDI has 
long been viewed as one of the important aspects of security and sovereignty. The price 
competitiveness and discomfort to the consumers have been ignored in the best interests of 
national sovereignty and security. It concludes China’s regulatory framework for 
telecommunications is relatively opaque and difficult to understand. The sector never received 
‘State Patronage’ as was extended to the manufacturing sector. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
China’s telecommunication sector currently is one of the fastest growing sectors in the world.1 
Constant upgradation of technology, business activity, consumer demand and monitoring of 
communication have put up several challenges for the Government to constantly look for 
strategies which should allow China to remain globally connected, business oriented and 
consumer friendly.  
Till almost mid-nineties the telecommunications sector in China enjoyed the monopoly of the 
Government having an exclusive ministry known as MPT (Ministry of Posts and 
Telecommunications) devoted to entire regulation and operation in the country. It functioned 
both as a regulator and an operator. China Telecom, one of the biggest State-Owned Enterprises 
(SOEs), was managing the communication services and distribution network as the only single 
service provider in the entire country. Propelled by the global demand and situation, developing 
countries like China initiated the process of liberalization and privatization of the sector. The 
China Telecom having the monopoly until then was broken in 1994 and another organization 
known as China Unicom was founded. China Telecom was separated from the MPT. Further, a 
set of organizations were created to provide value added services to the wide ranging demands 
of the consumers.  
In almost two decades since 1994, the telecommunications sector in China has undergone a sea 
change. From a completely state controlled regulated and operated sector, it has moved towards 
liberalisation and privatisation of the sector by introducing structural adjustment and 
institutional changes. 
Telecommunication service is considered in many countries, but more so in China as an 
important infrastructural service provider, hence endeavours to make available with world class 
service facilities at reasonable and affordable prices were always a challenge. To ease the 
pressure, China had made commitments in the WTO to open up its sector. It assumed foreign 
investor’s entry and contribution will be a ‘push factor’ in developing a long-term sustainable 
efficient system which will help its economy with more growth potential and remain a ‘key 
national industry’.  Key national industry because it performs a dual role; first as a key 
independent service industry in itself; and second as a critical support element for other service 
industries like financial and insurance services. 
In view of this backdrop, the paper attempts to locate how the telecommunication service sector 
has performed after China joined the WTO. Section 2 explains in detail how the sector has 
evolved with China’s accession to the WTO. Section 3 analyses the implications of the WTO’s 
services commitments on China. It analyzes the issue of foreign direct investment (FDI), its 
                                                 
1 Statistical Yearbook of China 2013, available at http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjsj/ndsj/2013/indexeh.htm last accessed 
10 May. 2013  
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restrictions and impact on the sector. It also looks into the aspect of regulatory independence 
and transparency in the system. Section 4 concludes the major findings. 
2. TELECOMMUNICATIONS SECTOR IN CHINA SINCE 2001 
The telecommunications service industry in China traditionally remained a closed unit, 
minutely monitored and tightly controlled by the Central government. It has been shielded from 
any external influence or foreign investment in basic services.2 With accession to the WTO, 
this highly protected industry was finally exposed to foreign competition. According to the 
China-US WTO Agreement3 signed on November 15, 1999, after China enters into the WTO, 
foreign firms could take 50% ownership of value-added services in two years and 49% for 
mobile and fixed-line services in five and six years, respectively. 4  In addition, China has 
accepted the principles of the WTO Reference Paper and made commitments to implement pro-
competitive regulatory policy in the telecommunications sector and to establish a WTO 
consistent legal and regulatory framework for its telecommunications industry.5 
As a milestone in the telecommunications reform and pledge to respect the WTO commitments, 
the National6 government in China in 2000 declared Telecommunications Regulations. They 
contributed to meeting of the WTO standards, set out rules and regulations for competition and 
cleared obstacles to entry of foreign private investment in telecommunications service sector. In 
order to establish a free and fair competition, the National government decided to create a 
transparent regulatory regime by institutionalizing a government body known as Ministry of 
Information Industry (MII) which became a successor to the Ministry of Posts and 
Telecommunications (MPT) as a result of governmental restructuring in 1998. This regulatory 
body has been replaced by Ministry of Industry and Information Technology (MIIT) in 2008. 
Thus, a new chapter was opened in China’s telecommunications services. The Chinese 
Government’s WTO commitments allowed the foreign direct investment to come into the 
indigenous telecom operating entities. According to the commitments, a foreign investment cap 
on basic telecommunications services operators was set at 25 percent in major cities and at 49 
                                                 
2 In 1994, limited competition in wireless sector was introduced with the entry of Unicom. See Chang (1994).  
3 This Agreement cleared the path for China to join the WTO. It was termed as the biggest blocking barrier for its 
entry. In order to access to the WTO, China must negotiate with each Member of the WTO and get bilateral 
agreements on market access. The negotiation with the United States is believed to be the most difficult because of 
the strict requirements from the United States. For more analyses about the process of China’s access to the WTO, 
see Abbott (1998), Anderson (1997), Geest (1998), and Zhao (1998). 
4 The New York Times, November 15, 1999. Also see the summary of the US-China Bilateral WTO Agreement at 
http://www. Uschina.org/public/991115a.html last accessed 15 May. 2013. For full text, see 
http://www.uschina.org/ last accessed 15 May.2013. 
5 “White House Factsheets” available at http://www.uschina.org/public/wto/factsheet/telecomm.html last accessed 
18 May. 2013. 
6 Central and National government are the same and they have been used interchangeably. 
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percent in semi-urban areas allowing the Chinese government to retain control by securing 
more than 50 percent of ownership. 
In mobile telecommunications, foreign investment allowed upto 25 percent share immediately 
upon accession. This share was to be allowed to rise to 49 percent after a 3-year period. For 
fixed network services, it was to take 5 years to reach the investment cap. The arrangement 
further calls for the cap to be raised to 50 percent after 2 years for value added services and 
paging services. The foreign investment cap also applied to the internet service providers. 
Detailed Chinese commitments under its schedule of the GATS are given in Table 1. By the 
time China became a member of the WTO, its telecom sector had opened up domestically in a 
significant way and many major service providers like China Telecom, China Unicom, China 
Mobile, China Netcom, and China Jitong were competing with each other. 
Table 1：China's Commitments under its WTO Services Schedule during 2001-2007 
Percentage and Geographic Coverage of Foreign Investment Permitted 
Type of Service 12/01–12/02 
12/02–
12/03 
12/03–
12/04 12/04–12/05 
12/05–
12/06 12/06–12/07 
Basic telecom 
services-fixed 
 
 
 
 
 
0% 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0% 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0% 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
25% in Beijing, 
Shanghai, and 
Guangzhou 
 
 
 
 
35% in 17 
cities 
 
 
 
 
 
49% with no 
geographic 
restrictions 
 
 
 
 
Basic telecom 
services – 
mobile 
 
 
 
25% in 
Beijing, 
Shanghai, 
and 
Guangzhou 
 
 
35% in 
17 cities 
 
 
 
No 
change 
 
 
 
 
49% with no 
geographic 
restrictions 
 
 
 
No change 
 
 
 
 
No change 
 
 
 
 
Value-added 
services and 
paging service 
 
 
 
30% in 
Beijing, 
Shanghai, 
and 
Guangzhou 
 
49%in17 
cities 
 
 
 
 
50% with 
no 
geograph
ic 
restrictio
ns 
 
No change 
 
 
 
 
No change 
 
 
 
 
No change 
 
 
 
Source: http://docsonline.wto.org/DDFDocuments/t/WT/ACC/CHN49A2.doc last accessed on 19 
May. 2013. 
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China witnessed a virtual explosion in the sector as both fixed and mobile users shot up 
significantly in its post accession period. By 2002, China’s telecommunications exchange 
capacity had reached 201 million lines and mobile switching capacity amounted to 235 million 
lines. The total number of telephone subscribers had gone upto 388 million— with 188 million 
fixed users and 162 million mobile users—making China’s telecommunications network the 
largest in the world in terms of size and subscribers.7 The number of wireless phone users in 
China had also reached 250 million by the end of 2003 (Statistical Year Book of China, 2005). 
China was not only regarded as a market for service providers but also as a manufacturing base 
for telecommunications equipment. Increase in subscribers had resulted in the expansion of 
domestic manufacturing industry. Demand for value added services by consumers led to 
constant upgradation in industry, which had forced China to look for state-of the-art technology.  
2.1 Analysis of Telecommunications Services Growth  
China operates one of the largest telecommunications networks in the world. With 215 million 
telephone lines in the world compared to 186 million in the US and around 42 million 
telephone lines in India in 2002 at the time of its accession to the WTO, it has seen a big jump 
in expanding its network over the last few years. Within a span of nine to ten years the 
expansion of the industry has gone up by almost four times (China Statistical Year Book, 2011).  
Recent trends showed that the mobile phone industry in China has also experienced a 
substantial rise in its sales. Driven by a growing number of handset users, increasing 
component prices for handsets, and a wider range of services bringing more value to customers, 
the market touched 4.7 billion Yuan in 2008 and 5.56 billion Yuan in 2009, according to the 
CCID Consulting8 blue paper. The paper suggested, "The key driver is value-added services," 
(Xinhua 27 June 2007 p. 9). Special services like accessories, music downloads or mobile TV 
represented only 2.5 percent of China's after-sales service market in 2004, but rose to 18.2 
percent in 2006. The blue paper showed that more than 40 percent of handset users wanted to 
watch handset TVs and a similar percentage were keen to download music into their handsets. 
"In half of our authorized maintenance stores, the income from value-added services has 
already surpassed the fees earned for repairing handsets," said Li Jianquan, Executive Director 
of Quality, Service and Administration of Lenovo Mobile. "In some stores, the ratio reaches 67 
percent," he said. "When customers come in to get their handset repaired, they might opt for a 
sophisticated new handset component like a high-definition colored screen," Jiang observed 
(http://english.cri.cn/3130/2007/06/27/262@242972.htm).There are now 487 million handset 
users in China with six million new users being added every month, according to the MII. 
According to the Ministry, the number is expected to reach 600 million by the end of 2010.  
                                                 
7 Ministry of Information Industry (MII) statistics as of April 2002. Available online: www. 
mii.gov.cn/mii/hyzw/tongjiziliao200203.htm last accessed 19 May.2013 
8 A joint stock limited company incorporated in the People’s Republic of China with limited liability. 
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Though telecommunications growth was hit by the global financial crisis since 2008, current 
statistics provided by MII suggest that growth has witnessed a rise. According to latest statistics 
provided by MII in 2009, China's telecom industry achieved accumulated revenue of 2.5 trillion 
Yuan, a year-on-year increase of 14.4 percent; and it reached operating revenue of 870.7 billion 
Yuan, a year-on-year increase of 4.1 percent. For various telecom sectors in China, revenue 
from the mobile communications network business increased by 13.2 percent year-on-year to 
509.09 billion Yuan, accounting for 60.4 percent of total revenue from main businesses; 
revenue from fixed line local network business declined by 14.4 percent to 135.68 billion Yuan, 
accounting for 16.1 percent; revenue from long-distance call network business decreased by 5.3 
percent to 98.26 billion Yuan, accounting for 11.7 percent; and revenue from data 
communications network business increased by 0.3 percent year-on-year to 99.4 billion Yuan, 
accounting for 11.8 percent. In 2009, the number of China's total landline and mobile phone 
users increased by 79.467 million to 1.061 billion from 2008. The number of fixed line users 
decreased by 26.671 million to 314 million in 2009; and in the same year the number of mobile 
phone users increased by 106.138 million to 747 million. In addition, the number of broadband 
users in China increased by 20.347 million to 103.226 million in 2009 (China Statistical Year 
Book, 2010). China is consistently noticing an increasing trend in terms of its mobile growth. 
In September 2013 it registered about 1206 million users which have risen to 1272 million in 
September 2014, whereas its number of landline users have declined touching about 278 
million in 2012 from 312 million in 2010 (China Statistical Yearbook, 2014) 
According to Prof. Andong Zhu, Tsinghua University, Beijing “prospects for telecom exports 
(equipments) during this global financial crisis look more promising than other manufacturing 
products. As China is a manufacturing engine for world economy, it will be able to produce 
quality telecom products at a cheaper price in the world with new innovations required for 
value added service. Major winner has been the Huawei Technology. It has exported many 
telecom equipments like modems to India and other developing countries. FIEs in China have 
also contributed nearly 60 percent to this growth and it is estimated that their contribution 
would rise further in future.” 
It is also analyzed from that the number of Urban Household Telephone Subscribers during the 
year 2005 was 172 million. In the year 2006, the number rose and had reached the 176 million 
mark. In the year 2007, the number decreased to 169 million. The number of rural fixed 
telephone subscribers during the year 2005 was 110 million. It increased in the year 2006 and 
had reached at 116 million, showing an increasing trend to the tune of 6 million, and it further 
went up by 1 million to reach 117 in 2007. The number of rural household telephone 
subscribers during the year 2005 was 100 million. It further increased in the year 2006 and had 
reached the 105 million mark. There was, however, no increase in this category in 2007 
(Statistical Yearbook of China, 2008).   
The growing number of subscribers during the year 2006 created more business, and the 
ministry’s projection of the telecom business income in 2006 reached more than 700 billion 
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Yuan (US $ 86 billion). During the 10th Five-Year Plan period between 2001 and 2005, 
China's telecom business income grew by an average 13.4 percent annually, with 100 million 
new subscribers every year. China has the world's largest number of phone subscribers, both for 
fixed-line and cell phones.9 
From the available data in Table 2, it is clear that the telecommunication services sector over 
the next seven years especially after its accession to the WTO in 2001 performed better. The 
total business volume of Post and Telecommunications in 2001 amounted to 4.55 billion Yuan, 
and reached to 5.69 billion Yuan in 2002. The volume further increased to 9.71 billion Yuan in 
2004 and showed a continuous increase, registering 23.6 billion Yuan in 2008 (International 
Telecommunication Union). The Number of mobile subscribers went up gradually. In 2001 at 
the time of accession, China had 145 million mobile users, one of the highest in the world. It 
experienced a significant rise in the year 2003, when it registered 269 million mobile users 
compared to 206 million in 2002. Between 2003 and 2004 and between 2004 and 2005, the rise 
is also significant as in 2004 it touched to get 334 million in 2004 and recorded 393 million in 
2005 (Appendix). 
Table 2：Basic Conditions of Post and Telecommunication Services during 2001-2010 
Basic conditions of post and telecommunication services during 2001-2010 
 
Item 
 
2001 2004 2006 2008 2009 2010 
Business Volume of  
Postal and 
Telecommunication 
Service (100 million 
Yuan) 
                   
 
 
4556.26 
 
9712.29 
 
 
 
15325.9 
 
 
 
23649.5 
 
 
 
27193.5 
 
 
 
31978.5 
 
 
Number of Mobile 
Subscribers at Year-
end (10000 
subscribers) 
 
 
14522.2 
 
33482.4 
 
 
 
 
46105.8 
 
 
 
 
64124.5 
 
 
 
 
74721.4 
 
 
 
 
85900.3 
 
 
 
Local  Telephone 
Subscribers at Year-
end (10000 
subscribers) 
 
 
18036.8 
 
31175.6 
 
36778.6 
 
34035.9 
 
31373.2 
 
29434.2 
                                                 
9  MII 2006. 
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Local  (Urban) 
Telephone 
Subscribers at Year-
end (10000 
subscribers) 
 
 
11193.7 
 
21025.1 
 
25132.9 
 
23155.9 
 
21190.0 
 
19658.1 
Rural Telephone 
Subscribers at Year-
end (10000 
subscribers) 
 
 
6843.1 
 
10150.5 
 
11645.6 
 
10880.0 
 
10183.2 
 
9776.1 
Number of Post & 
Telecommunications 
Offices (Unit) 
 
57136 
 
66393 
 
 
 
 
62799 
 
 
 
 
69146 
 
 
 
 
65672 
 
 
 
 
75739 
 
 
 
Length of Postal 
Routes and Rural 
Delivery Routes 
(10000km) 
 
659.53 
 
686.70 
 
 
 
 
693.6 
 
 
 
 
735.0 
 
 
 
 
770.4 
 
 
 
 
832.6 
 
 
 
 Source: Stats. Gov. cn last accessed 23 June. 2013. 
a) The business volume of postal and telecommunication services before 2000 was calculated 
at 1990 constant prices and that in 2001 was calculated at 2000 constant prices. The rate of 
increase at constant prices was 27.6 % in 2001.The same applies to the table following.  
b) Statistical coverages of business volume of postal and telecommunication services and 
pieces of express mail services are China Post Group before     2006, and postal enterprises 
above designated size (with annual business revenue above 2 million yuan). The same 
applies to the table following. 
c) The indicator of number of postal offices referred to postal and communication offices 
before 1998, and referred to postal offices from 1999 to 2010; it included postal offices and 
postal sub-stations since 2002, and was postal enterprises above designated size since 2007.  
In 2008, it further increased to register 641 million. Similarly, local landline telephone 
subscribers also witnessed a rising trend. It registered 180 million in 2001 and rose significantly 
to reach 214 million in 2002. The number further increased to 311 million in 2004 and 350 
million were finally registered by 2005 end. In 2008 the number of local landline subscriber 
came down, registering 340 million. This has happened due to consumers shifting to mobile 
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phones. Local (urban) telephone subscriber numbers experienced an upward trend consistently 
from 111 million in 2001, and went up to register 239 million in 2005. It witnessed an increase 
in 2006 reaching 251 million, but in 2007 and 2008 the number has come down to touch 248 
and 231 million respectively (Appendix). Likewise from the table, it is evident that other 
indicators like rural telephone subscribers, and number of post and telecommunications offices 
(PTO) witnessed some fluctuation in growth (Appendix). Table 2 shows there has been a 
continuous increase in business volume of postal and telecommunication service; number of 
mobile subscribers and there has been fluctuating trend in urban landline telephone subscribers 
and rural landline subscribers. Currently, China is the fastest growing telecom sector in the 
world registering more than 1 billion subscribers and China Mobile is the largest service 
provider in the world. According to the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology 
(MIIT), “The number of Chinese mobile phone users topped 1 billion by the end of February 
2012. The MIIT said in a statement posted on its website that the total number of mobile phone 
users increased by 20.67 million during the first two months this year to hit a record high of 
1.01 billion. The number of 3G mobile phone users rose by 15.5 million in the first two months 
of 2012 to reach 143.92 million. During the same period, the number of fixed-line telephone 
users dropped by 828,000 to 284.29 million users.” 10 On the whole the telecom service sector 
remained buoyant and growth oriented. 
2.2 Compound Annual Growth Rate (CAGR) Analysis11 
In 2001, at the time of accession, China had more than 180 million landline telephone users 
which reached to 367.7 million in 2006 showing a compound annual growth rate (CAGR) of 
15.3 percent. Similarly in 2006, landline phone users per 100 inhabitants were 27.79 percent 
compared to 14.06 percent in 2001, registering a CAGR of 14.6 in 2006 over 2001 (Table 3). It 
can be also observed from the Table 3 that the percentage of CAGR registered at 15.3 percent 
during the period 2001–2006. However, calculation based on sourcing data from the 
International Telecommunication Union (2007), it was observed the percentage of CAGR 
during 2000-2005 stood at 19.3 percent which suggests a decline in the growth of mainline 
telephone in China. There has been a significant decline in terms of mainline telephone services 
in China possibly due to growth in mobile services. China also experienced like the other 
countries in the world, a mobile revolution making its telecom sector to grow as one of the 
fastest in the world. 
Table 3：China’s Main Telephone Lines (CAGR %) (2001-2006) 
 Year Main CAGR % Main CAGR % (2001-
                                                 
10 Xinhua News Agency 20 April. 2012. news.xinhuanet.com/english/last accessed 15 June.2013 
11 Compound Annual Growth Rate (CAGR) Analysis during the period 2001-2006 is taken into consideration 
because this period was the most restrictive phase of China’s WTO agreements on telecommunication. After China 
joined the WTO in a span of 5 years it was supposed to phase out all its restrictions. This exercise was undertaken 
to give a perspective on the growth of the sector. 
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Telephone 
lines (In 000') 
(2001-2006) Telephone 
lines per 
100 
inhabitants  
2006) 
2001 180368 
15.31 
2001 14.06 
14.6 
2006 367786 2006 27.79 
Source: International Telecommunication Union 2007 www.itu.int last accessed 9 July. 2012.  
 
Table 4：China's Mobile Cellular Subscribers (CAGR %) (2001-2006) 
Cellular Mobile Subscribers (in 
000')  
Year   
CAGR % 
(2001-2006)  Year 2006 
2001 144820 
26.1 
Per 100 
inhabitants 
% 
Digital 
As % of 
total 
telephone 
subscribers 
2006 461058 34.83 85.3 55.6 
 Source: International Telecommunication Union 2007 www.itu.int last accessed 9 July. 2012. 
Table 4 indicates that the growth of cellular mobile subscribers in China witnessed an upward 
swing after its accession. China registered 144 million mobile users in 2001 and 461 million in 
2006. It had about 55.6 percent of mobile users out of total telephone subscribers in 2006. It 
can also be observed from the Table 4 that a CAGR of 26.1 percent was noticed in 2006 (World 
Telecommunications Development Report, 2006, International Telecommunication Union).  
2.3 Telecom Industry during 2007-1012 
During this period most of the restrictions on the entry of foreign players to domestic market 
were supposed to be withdrawn. Around 2007–08, the telecom industry witnessed new 
dynamics in relation to resource distribution and development trends. On one hand, the mobile 
businesses grew fast while on the other, the landline businesses rapidly declined. Decrease in 
landline venture resulted in low economic benefits for the economy. As a result, the gap 
between enterprises at different levels increased and the competition dynamics in the market 
lost their balance. During May 2008, MII, the National Development and Reform Commission 
and Ministry of Finance decided to further restructure the telecom industry. The six major 
telecom operators were reshuffled to three, to improve the performance of the industry. The 
                                                 
12 The period 2007-10 is analyzed to show if any further change or opening up did take place in China’s 
telecommunication service sector. 
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three major players were China Telecom, China Unicom, and China Mobile, and each one of 
them is involved with mobile, landline and broadband (China Daily, May 25 2008 p. 8).  
The current telecom industry in China looks promising as gradual and marginal phase out of 
restrictions have taken place.  The foreign telecom players, who have been waiting for a long 
time to serve the Chinese telecom market were now considering giving shape to their plans of 
entering the world’s largest and highly lucrative telecom industry. Various foreign players such 
as SK Telecom of South Korea and Telefonica (the second largest phone company of Europe) 
already enjoyed substantial stakes in China’s fixed-line operations, China Telecom and China 
Netcom. ‘Restructuring of the Chinese telecom industry would give these players an 
opportunity to bring their mobile business to the country as the domestic partners now have 
access to the country’s wireless market,’ says a telecom analyst.13 This sentiment was also 
expressed by other Chinese experts (Zhu and Guoxing 2009: Personal Interview). For instance, 
SK telecom, which held 6.61 percent of China Unicom’s total equity before the telecom 
industry reorganization sought suitable opportunities to raise its stake in the company. 
As if to reward these moves, the Chinese government announced in September 2008 that it 
would relax access to its telecom industry for foreign investors by cutting minimum investment 
criteria by as much as 50 percent. It is expected that deregulation by the government may 
trigger an influx of foreign investment in the Chinese telecom sector. The Chinese Government 
took up the initiative to finalize issuance of 3G licenses in January 2009, which had opened up 
new avenues for foreign players, to venture into the market as the market which was expected 
to create huge demand for capital among the Chinese telecom operators. These companies are 
actively expanding and upgrading their existing networks in order to gain a favorable position 
in the country's most promising 3G environment. 
3. IMPLICATIONS OF SERVICES COMMITMENTS ON CHINA  
Unlike GATT, the mandate of the WTO included the services sector. With the introduction of 
General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) 14  in 1995, the growing importance of 
services sector has assumed significance. As data and literature on post-accession are quite 
sparse on China’s services sector, the component of analysis becomes limited on the issue. A 
significant work done by Ianchovichina and Martin in 2001 (Mattoo 2003, p. 303) taking into 
account the market access and national treatment commitments, says that the coverage of 
market access commitments (the unweighted average count) was 57.4 percent. Table 5 gives an 
idea about the analysis done in this study. 
                                                 
13 From the discussion held at a business meet organized by the CII and Embassy of India, Beijing at the Marriot 
hotel in Beijing on April 15 2009. 
14 Detailed provision relating to GATS can be accessed from  http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/26-
gats_01_e.htm 
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Accession commitments in China are much higher than the commitments offered by any other 
group of countries including high income countries in the Uruguay Round. The ‘average 
coverage’ a measure of coverage that better reflects the extent of liberalization of services was 
38 percent for China, which shows more openness about the sector compared to other high 
income group countries. The share of completely liberal commitments (no restrictions) in the 
maximum possible commitments was 23 percent for China, much higher than that of any other 
group of developing countries but somewhat lower than that of high income countries. From 
this, one can easily observe that China’s commitments towards national treatment are wider and 
deeper than many other groups of countries.  
Table 5：Coverage of Specific Commitments during Late 1990s (%)   
 High-
income 
countries 
Low and  
middle-
income 
countries  
Large 
developing 
nations  
China 
     
     
Market access     
Unweighted average count 
(sectors-modes listed as a share of 
maximum possible) 
47.3 16.2 38.6 57.4 
Average coverage (sectors-modes 
listed as a share of maximum 
possible, weighted by openness or 
binding factors) 
35.9 10.3 22.9 38.1 
Coverage/count (average coverage 
as a share of the average count) 
75.9 63.6 59.3 66.4 
No restrictions as a share of total 
offer (unweighted count) 
57.3 45.5 38.7 40.2 
No restrictions as a share of 
maximum possible  
27.1 7.3 14.9 23.1 
National treatment     
Unweighted average count 
(sectors-modes listed as a share of 
maximum possible) 
47.3 16.2 38.8 57.4 
Average coverage (sectors-modes 
listed as a share of maximum 
possible, weighted by openness or 
binding factors) 
37.2 11.2 25.5 45.0 
Coverage/count (average coverage 78.6 69.1 66.1 78.4 
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as a share of the average count) 
No restrictions as a share of total 
offer (unweighted count) 
65.1 58.0 52.3 63.5 
No restrictions as a share of 
maximum possible  
30.8 9.4 20.2 36.5 
Memo item     
No restrictions on market access 
and national treatment as a share of 
maximum possible  
24.8 6.9 14.3 29.8 
Number of sectors committed 293.0 100.0 239.0 356.0 
 Source: Mattoo (2003) p. 303   
The schedule of commitments towards market access and national treatment that China made 
while entering into the WTO are very significant. A closer look at those commitments sector by 
sector reveals that for most sectors modes 115 and 2 are either fully open or unbound and not 
subject to specific restrictions. Commitments on mode 4 specified horizontally rather than 
sector by sector are also standard. Entry is guaranteed to managers, corporate executives, and 
specialists defined as senior employees of a corporation of the WTO members being engaged in 
the foreign invested enterprises in the territory of the People’s Republic of China for 
conducting business. They may be granted a long-term stay permit as stipulated in the terms of 
contracts concerned or an initial stay of three years, whichever is shorter (Report of the 
Working Party, 2001). No commitments are made regarding other categories of movement of 
natural persons, for example unskilled personnel or movement not linked to commercial 
presence. With regard to mode 3, dealing with commercial presence, the official policy of 
China today even puts into effect a lot of restrictive measures. These are as follows: 
Form of establishment: foreign enterprise can make an entry to China on specific sectors in two 
ways. The typical restriction is the requirement to form a joint venture; which is either an 
equity joint venture (EJV) or contractual joint venture (CJV). Foreign ownership in EJVs is 
frequently restricted to specified levels ranging from minority ownership (49% or less) or 
majority ownership (50%) or full membership. The foreign equity limits included in China’s 
GATS Schedule, and China’s strict accordance with those limits, mean that no supplier of 
telecommunications services through commercial presence in China can be ‘owned’ by persons 
of another Member, and few are likely to be ‘controlled’ by such persons.16Geographic scope: 
Commercial activity may be allowed only in specified cities, for example in Shanghai or 
Shenzhen or in special economic zones. Business scope: Transactions may be permitted only 
                                                 
15 Cross-border supply under mode 1 formed the subject of the only WTO dispute to date on telecommunications 
services, which involved a challenge by the United States to Mexico’s telecommunications regulation. 
16 GATS, art XXVIII: n (i), (ii). 
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with a subset of consumers or restricted in some other way. Regulatory requirements: Foreign 
firms may be required to have certain amount of assets and be established as a representative 
office for a certain period of time before commencing full business operations. 
According to this specific schedule of commitments, FDI in joint ventures will not exceed 30 
percent in specific cities such as Beijing, Shanghai, and Guangzhou. Within one year after 
accession, this geographical area will be extended to Chengdu, Dalian, Fuzhou, Nanjing, and 
others. One year after accession, foreign investment up to 49 per- cent17 will be allowed and 
within two years up to, but not more than, 50 percent. The above geographical restriction will 
be lifted within five years from the date of accession.18  The telecom services will include value 
added services such as voice mail, electronic mail, online information and data base retrieval, 
internet content, etc. These were the commitments made by China when it entered the WTO. 
While the five-year “roadmap” for implementation of its scheduled market opening ended in 
December 2006 with most of the commitments met, some key commitments in sectors 
important to the US economy still have not been  fulfilled (US-China Business Council).  
Similarly, on the issue of national treatment it had not committed any limitation which signifies 
that the foreign invested enterprises and domestic players will have no discrimination in terms 
of treatment in the country. That also amply demonstrates that it wanted to encourage foreign 
players to come in, but in a gradual and geographically restricted manner.19  
In the services negotiations under the GATS framework countries make offers and request to 
achieve their specific schedule of commitments. These commitments are made at the time of 
accession to the WTO. The idea is this that when the negotiations at multilateral level were 
proving to be difficult to reach its desirable end, countries resorted to offer-and-request 
mechanism. China did the same thing in 2005 when it revised its offers20 in a range of services 
in anticipation that this process or initiative would ease the negotiations to reach its final end. 
The revised offers in China’s telecom services suggested that the foreign service suppliers will 
be permitted to establish joint venture in value added telecommunications enterprises without 
confining to 30 percent equity and restricting to cities like Shanghai, Guangzhou and Beijing. 
Similarly, in other services such as on-line information and/or data processing, foreign 
investment in the joint ventures shall be no more than 50 percent. This is to suggest that with 
three to four years of accession China proceeded with its liberalization commitments in telecom 
services. This in a way was expected of China to do it because it had promised to remove such 
kind of restrictions and also became keen to liberalize the sector. 
3.1 Implications during Restrictive Phase as Agreed under Accession Process to WTO 
(2002–2007)  
                                                 
17 GATS Schedule, 16-19 (telecommunication services, mode 3); FITE Rules, Art 6. 
18 WT/MIN (01)/3/Add.2 WTO Ministerial Conference Fourth Session Doha, 9-13 November 2001, p. 17. 
19  Ibid, p: 17. 
20 TN/S/O/CHN/Rev.1 29 July 2005, WTO. 
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China’s opening up of the telecommunications sector in a gradual and phased manner to 
foreign players was seen both as an opportunity as well as a threat. The Central Government 
was extremely cautious in allowing market access to foreign players. After joining the WTO, 
China, as a matter of principle, had to open its sector. For a long time restrictions in the form of 
commercial establishment have been prevalent in China and being justified as a source of 
acquiring technology or obtaining a share of monopoly rents. All such restrictions slowly apply 
to the forms of establishment. Restrictions of these kinds mentioned in the WTO agreement 
which confine foreign ventures to five cities for five years as in the case of insurance, will 
encourage agglomeration of these activities in the favoured cities, which will be difficult to 
reverse when the restrictions are subsequently lifted. Such kind of restrictions will have a rather 
adverse impact on the rural areas of the country even if they have the potential or the 
comparative advantage of the designated urban areas. Policies of liberalisation towards telecom 
services pursued geographically was at one level a conscious decision of the Central 
Government because it knew in such pockets the rising purchasing power and developed 
infrastructure will be able to sustain such telecom growth and consumers’ demands will also be 
met (Xiangshuo 2009: Personal Interview). It is also the pressure of the domestic telecom lobby, 
which exerted immense pressure on the Government not to liberalize the telecom policy and 
allow the foreign players to come in. Though consumers complained because of poor service 
and high tariff structure, the Government had imposed during this period hardly addressed such 
concerns. The Government benefited from such policies as it obtained hefty revenue directly 
from the telecom sector (Xiangshuo 2009: Personal Interview). 
China’s telecom liberalisation is delayed due to vested interests of various interest groups. 
These groups are domestic telecom operators like the China Mobile, China Telecom and China 
Unicom who never wanted an early opening up of the sector. Though the commitments made 
by China in the WTO were regarded, yet the Government took five to six years to phase out 
most of the restrictions for foreign players to enter the Chinese market. This kind of market 
restrictions which remained after the accession till 2007 were supported by the Government as 
it provided lead time to the Government to gauge the impact of telecom liberalization in the 
country (Lei 2009: Personal Interview).  
3.1.1 Positive Impact 
China’s late entry of telecommunications in world trade is justified as it is a developing country 
and its domestic industry is not strong enough to face the global competition. Being a strategic 
sector, the Government may retain its control over the sector. Implications of late opening 
might not have been profitable for the Government, but the issue of security has never been 
compromised (Sang Ho 2009: Personal Interview). According to Prof. Hong Song : ‘Chinese 
domestic firms were not very strong in terms of their infrastructure, innovation and service. As 
a result there was intense pressure from the industry lobby not to open up the sector. The 
Chinese Government respected their concerns’ (Song 2000, p. 14). 
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According to Prof. Andong Zhu, Tsinghua University, Beijing, China: ‘When pressure on 
China mounted as China was negotiating for its entry into the WTO, it decided to open up its 
telecommunications sector in a phased manner confined to a few cities initially as it wanted to 
realize the impact of such liberalization policies. Telecom remained a closed sector for political 
reasons. It is also argued that the Chinese Government wanted to experiment the system of 
opening up on a selective geographical pattern. The Government was fully aware that such 
pockets had the purchasing power and initial development of telecom infrastructure will 
generate revenue for the Government.’ So the geographical opening up the sector and, precisely 
in a few select areas was a conscious decision by the National government to also take into 
account the affordability of price mechanism. Initial competition in Chinese market remained 
virtually an urbanized phenomenon, where more and more people were interested to pay higher 
price to access service by the foreign service providers. According to Prof. Andong Zhu: ‘such 
restriction of service never created any division among the rural folk and urban dwellers; rather 
it helped the Government to protect its domestic industry and allow the competition to slowly 
enter the market.’  Implications of this opening up in a phased manner have not put the 
Government in any jeopardy as far as social and political security is concerned. As a part of the 
overall WTO’s accession commitments, China had to open up and remove its restrictions on 
foreign players’ entry. With the liberalization and FDI coming into the sector, the employment 
prospects have naturally gone up. In fact, the telecom sector is providing more employment 
currently than textiles. During this current financial crisis, the prospects for performing better 
lay more with the telecom compared to textiles (Zhu 2009: Personal Interview).  
The overall accession commitments led to some amount of dilution of discretionary power of 
the Chinese Government as it fulfilled most of its commitments over a period of five to six 
years from the date of its accession. It has eliminated all its restrictions relating to foreign entry 
and foreign ownership. It will observe strictly national treatment, which basically means it will 
stop discriminating between trading partners and not even favour its own domestic firms. In 
totality, it vows to follow a free and fair rule-based trading system. What China is going to lose 
most importantly in the wake of all these developments is its freedom to exercise its own 
policies at any point of time. The commitments are all desirable but how far the continuous 
restrictions on foreign entry and ownership will help China to have full benefits of foreign 
investment is an issue that needs to be debated. The commitments try to eliminate discretion 
existing in the system. It is a matter of fact that liberalization in many areas is taking place in 
China slowly because the Chinese government is reluctant to liberalize certain areas.  
Socio-economic factors and political pressures from various quarters hold them back and as a 
result protection still continues. The government even feels certain incumbent domestic 
enterprises or suppliers are unable to cope up or face the challenges of liberalization as the 
reforms in these may take longer for them to fight back. All these may lead to some form of 
protection and once protection is given will be difficult to lift it. 
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In addition, entry through joint venture looks to be a positive step for the foreign firms. Initially 
they can collaborate with a local firm as the firm will have the minimum assets and they will 
find an access to operate in China. However, binding ownership restrictions will affect the 
firm’s performance because the firm will not be in a position to obtain new technology and 
better manpower to raise its performance.  
3.1.2 Negative impact 
Though China has agreed to remove all restrictions on foreign entry, the Government feels 
somehow ambivalent about the nature and scope of foreign entry. What is uppermost in the 
Chinese Government’s mind is whether unrestricted regime will be good for China and to what 
extent, it is going to devalue the total control of the Chinese government on this issue. One 
reason could be that unrestricted entry of foreign companies may just completely swallow the 
Chinese market, as the domestic firms are not so well developed or well equipped in terms of 
providing better services at such a lower cost. Another reason is the issue of economies of scale. 
For example, in a vibrant services sector like telecommunications, if one domestic firm has 
worked out substantial fixed costs of networks, competitive bidding by foreign entry could lead 
to some kind of an inefficient network duplication (Armstrong, Cowan and Vickers 1994, p. 
42). 
In a technologically driven world, technology can even minimize the cost at some level. 
Openness in the system allows a country to have better technological leverage as to how a 
country can stop all these and go ahead with its old sterile and obsolete technology. The power 
and spirit of competition is yielding much better results. 
Besides, entry restrictions do not develop a sense of competition among the local firms or 
incumbents; rather it creates an atmosphere of complacency or sometimes leads to collision, 
which ultimately results in unproductivity and inefficiency. More importantly, sometimes even 
the regulator is not adequately placed than the competitive system to derive the number of firms 
operating in the market and as to how they are being priced to produce or provide the best 
possible services. All this suggests that China may not worry to open up its sector or restrict 
foreign entry. 
However during a field trip to China in 2009 it was largely felt by the author as he made few 
interactions with the Chinese consumers21 regarding the restriction of the market has suggested 
that ISD calls have become very expensive with the majority of the domestic players in the 
market. Price sensitivity and faster and better service network and connectivity to the outside 
world have created frustration among the Chinese people and these societal concerns have been 
largely ignored in the best interests of the national security and sovereignty. 
                                                 
21 Mobile SIM card shop owners, shopkeepers, corporate executives, academicians and researchers based in Dalian, 
Shanghai and Beijing 
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Excessive capitalisation requirements to the tune of 2 billion Yuan in the telecommunication 
sector as a part of the China’s regulations for foreign invested telecommunications enterprises 
proved an entry barrier for foreign telecom investors. As a result to develop an economically 
viable and efficient telecommunications services market in China had become difficult. This 
kind of restriction inhibited investor to turn to the Chinese market for future investment. 
However with the gradual liberalisation in the sector, the capitalization requirement had 
significantly come down to RMB 1 million in Basic Telecom Services (BTS) by 200822 under 
severe pressure form the US.23 However these minimum capital requirements are a common 
regulatory tool in China, (Crosby 2007) and they are included in China’s GATS Schedule in a 
number of sectors, such as travel agency/tour operator services, 24  but not in the field of 
telecommunications. They are normally not found in other members, telecommunication 
service markets.25 
For many successful foreign enterprises such huge capital requirements for commercial 
purposes were never a practice and to invest so much in developing infrastructure in a different 
country initially did not look a very profitable proposition. Such policy doesn’t make positive 
contribution to a domestic infrastructural service like telecommunications especially at a time 
when the global telecom sector is facing huge capital resource crunch.   
China’s huge capitalisation requirements were also inconsistent with the licensing practices of 
other liberalizing economies. A global review of the start up capital requirement for a basic 
service provider found no amount of capitalization fee in the US, the EU, Canada, Japan, 
Australia, Brazil, Chile, Argentina. Hong Kong requires a performance bond; India requires a 
bank guarantee from US $ 5 million to US $ 80 million depending on geographic scope.  It is 
only Taiwan which maintains a rigid policy like China (Brilliant, M. and Waterman, J., China’s 
WTO Implementation: A Three Year Assessment Report, 2004). This high capitalisation policy 
had restricted the movement of foreign service providers entering China. The policy also 
discouraged the foreign companies to engage in any joint venture with a Chinese partner. 
China's high capitalisation requirement for basic telecommunications services has limited its 
market access. 
Another negative impact is visualized in terms of having a choice of partner to enter into the 
Chinese market. BTS suppliers whether domestic entities or foreign invested telecom 
enterprises (FITEs) must be 51 per cent State-owned. This effectively limits the foreign 
                                                 
22 Decision on Amending Provisions on Administration of Foreign-Invested Telecommunications Enterprises, State 
Council Decree No 534 (promulgated and effective 10 September 2008) part II. 
23 USTR, Report to Congress on China’s WTO Compliance (December 2008) 90; USTR, 2009 National Trade 
Estimate Report on Foreign Trade Barriers (2009),p. 112. 
24 GATS Schedule, pp. 36-37. 
25 WTO Council for Trade in Services, Report of the Meeting Held on 23 September 2005: Note by the Secretariat, 
S/C/M/80 (17 October 2005) [37] (evidence presented by the United States); USTR, Report to Congress on 
China’s WTO Compliance (December 2009),p. 99 
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ownership of paging service to 49 per cent. The 51 per cent State-ownership requirement also 
means that any other BTS supplier achieving the maximum foreign equity of 49 per cent as 
allowed in China’s GATS Schedule must partner with a wholly State-owned company. Even 
achieving a lower level of foreign equity would require majority State-ownership of the 
Chinese partners overall. This State-ownership requirement therefore significantly obstructs the 
entry of FITE and reduces their choice in securing a Chinese partner to establish an FITE.26 In 
effect, it also grants China’s discretion in determining whether to allow a given foreign supplier 
to establish an FITE, because the State owns the potential Chinese partners. Practical wisdom 
therefore in a way suggests how important it is to be connected with the State.  In practice, it 
seems according to Irene Wu, (2009: 60) ‘[o] nly firms that have the support of the State 
Council and its ministries may enter the market’. 
This policy adopted by China dissuaded many foreign enterprises to enter the market. As a 
result, China suffered from developing its telecom sector as a modern, productive, and 
sophisticated sector. It lost the opportunity of getting sophisticated technological services and 
other managerial expertise into the sector, which in turn would have helped China in the 
diffusion of knowledge and make the economy more efficient. Lack of access to better services 
remained a bottleneck for the whole industrial sector. Such restrictive policy did not help the 
consumers. This policy remained active for the first three years of accession and slowly such 
restrictions were lifted in the interest of the economy.  
Such restrictions proved to be disadvantageous for the country as well as for the consumers and 
were also not in conformity with the commitments of the accession process. Restriction on 
foreign ownership was proving to be a major hindrance in the liberalisation of trade services in 
China. There was only one way in which foreign presence in China can be administered, i.e., 
entry through a joint venture with varied degree of limits on the extent of foreign ownership. 
China has undertaken a series of reforms in gradually phasing out those restrictions but still in 
the areas of life insurance and telecommunications, such restrictions persist.  
Besides, the policy of geographical limitation followed after China joined the WTO in terms of 
opening up of certain major cities like Shanghai and others to foreign players and limiting to 
rest of the country, greatly impeded China’s uniform growth in the telecom sector. As a part of 
China’s own commitments to the WTO, this policy of geographical limitations may have 
widened the intra-regional disparities. Though China was committed to phasing out of 
geographical restrictions, sequential approach to this kind of liberalization may prove even 
more damaging in the long run. The existing pockets of development are going to witness even 
more progress as more economic activities are going to be concentrated in these areas. This 
would even widen the scope of intra-regional inequality. With due course of liberalization 
occurring in the hinterland at a later stage, there is a doubt whether hinterland economy will be 
                                                 
26 WTO Council for Trade in Services, Report of the Meeting Held on 5 November 2009: Note by the Secretariat, 
S/C/M/96 (13 November 2009). 
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able to adjust to the pace of progress that had occurred in the coastal belt. Inequality may thus 
continue to persist. These lacunae should be able to strengthen its case for lifting the 
geographical restrictions simultaneously rather than sequentially.  
3.1.3 Economic and Political Hurdles for Opening Up 
China’s policy relating to restrictions on foreign ownership continues to be dominated 
essentially for two reasons—economic and political. Economic reason can be attributed to the 
fact of extending limited ownership by which foreign companies will be able to ensure 
efficiency-cum enhancing cost and services factor, whereas political reason implies that there is 
a huge adjustment cost involved that an immediate transfer of an ownership would lose control 
of the firm, which ultimately could lead to layoffs. This picture is well known to the Chinese 
Government and they visualize a major social backlash. But the liberalization on the other hand 
promises to provide better service by not developing a monopolistic scenario rather than 
bringing in a competitive system by introducing competing firms to provide quality service. 
The above analysis gives an idea about the fact that accession commitments and its fulfillment 
are beneficial for a country like China. With its size, and a huge burgeoning middle class 
having a strong purchasing power, with great amount of infrastructural development and an 
earnest drive towards modernization, China can achieve spectacular success from this on-going 
liberalization process. If it is to make the most of liberalisation that it had committed to after 
becoming a WTO member, then it has to put its independent regulatory network in place. China 
has not so far implemented its WTO Reference Paper commitment to establish an independent 
regulator. 
The Chinese Government still owns and controls all major operators in the telecommunications 
industry, and the MIIT still regulates the sector. To create an independent regulator, China 
requires a series of reforms to be undertaken in the immediate future like establishment of a 
professional body that is separate from, and not accountable to, any basic telecom supplier. The 
body should be capable of issuing impartial telecom decisions and rules. Specifically, it is 
important that the regulatory body adopts transparent procedures for drafting, finalizing, 
implementing and applying regulations and decisions. It must take appropriate measures 
consistent with the WTO Reference Paper, to prevent dominant suppliers from engaging in, or 
continuing with anti-competitive practices. It must set up an independent and objective process 
for administrative reconsideration of its decisions and appropriate procedures and authority to 
enforce China’s WTO telecom commitments such as the ability to impose fines, order 
injunctive relief, and modify, suspend, or revoke a license. As the services sector is dynamic 
and rapidly growing, a strong, flexible domestic regulatory body is very much essential to 
tackle certain key issues like destabilization in the market, asymmetrical and inadequate 
consumer information, developing monopolistic tendencies, and guarantee fair and equitable 
access (Kanungo 2005, p. 344). 
Volume 10, No. 1 
84 
The first regulatory reform should come in the area of physical infrastructure like roads and 
railways for land transport and other specialized distribution networks, like cable and satellite 
telecommunications (UNCTAD and World Bank, 1994). Unless a thorough regulatory 
mechanism is created, the market is going to witness some disturbance as the incumbent may 
not allow competition to set in and deny the competitors access to essential facilities. 
Second, as services markets in China are being opened up, due importance must be given to 
providing consumers with the quality information in intermediate and knowledge based 
services. Normally in a large market, consumers may not find the appropriate information about 
the kind of services they are buying. For example, a consumer may not easily assess the 
competence of a professional such as a doctor or a lawyer or the effectiveness of a hospital or 
services of a transport system. Further obtaining that information from anywhere in the first 
place is difficult; secondly that information will prove to be expensive. In such a situation, an 
effective regulatory body having more autonomy and flexibility if in place can take care of 
increasing demand of social welfare. 
3.2 Issue of FDI in Telecommunications Services 
The issue of FDI in China’s telecommunications services sector occupies a critical place in 
China’s post-WTO accession period. The FDI in services virtually remained banned or 
extremely restrictive prior to its accession (Nolan and Wang 1999: 182). The scenario changed 
when the establishment of MII as the regulatory body came into existence and took measures to 
put in place an effective regulatory mechanism to monitor the foreign investment.  
However, one of the significant reasons for China not allowing FDI in telecom services has 
been its deep concern towards national security and sovereignty. State control of 
communications network and services has long been viewed as one of the important aspects of 
security and sovereignty. Ideological reasons also played a role in restricting FDI in telecom 
services and allowed the sector to move quite cautiously (Xiangshuo 2009: Personal Interview). 
As Wu Jichuan explained: “The rules prevented foreigners from owning telecom; there was 
worry that China’s security could be jeopardized” (Kuhn 2010, p. 322). It has often been 
observed in Asia particularly the linkage between national security and telecommunication 
services has been invoked as one of the main reasons for restricting the foreign ownership of 
operators (Janda 1999, p. 23). At the same time, the demand and ability of a country’s 
economic growth is fully dependent on such network of services, which is also equally 
recognized by the country. The countries, therefore, are trying hard to balance these 
contradictory and functional imperatives (Drake 2001, pp. 27–28). 
Countries in the 1960s and 1970s and during Uruguay Round shared the view that Western 
technology played a key role in enhancing their economic growth. Based on pragmatic 
assessment, countries realized giving up a degree of national sovereignty would result in ample 
dividends in terms of consumers’ welfare and deployment of equipment and efficient services 
(Frieden 2001, p.149). In a centrally planned economy like China, telecommunications were 
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part of national security network and part of country’s requirement to stay in touch with the 
country side. As a result, sovereignty and national security since 1978 till its accession to the 
WTO have considerably influenced China’s policy on FDI in services and the broader direction 
of reform agenda in telecommunications.27 
With the accession to the WTO, the policy debate shifted from a ban to how and to what degree 
the foreign ownership of operators and network services should be allowed without affecting 
the country’s national interest. Joining the WTO the Government automatically opened up the 
sector though the deeper issue of national security and sovereignty remained a primary concern. 
Recent regulations explicitly incorporate the notion of sovereignty. For example, rules 
governing the administration of telecommunications provide that ‘when managing 
telecommunications construction, it is necessary to safeguard the state sovereignty in 
telecommunications.’28  
With the accession to the WTO, several foreign enterprises have made inroads to China. Flag 
Telecom from Europe is the first and the only private operator, that landed a submarine 
telecommunication cable in China. In addition to this, in 2003 South Korea’s SK telecom 
joined hands with China Unicom to develop the first Sino-foreign joint value added mobile 
service provider in China.  
In compliance with the WTO agreements, China till 2004 had allowed foreign operators equity 
of 25 percent in basic services joint ventures. Although 18 foreign firms are reported to have 
applied for investment in joint ventures, the scope of investment still remained narrow 
(Laperrouza 2006, p.161).High capitalization requirements have acted as a huge disincentive 
for all these international carriers.  
Besides the issue of security and sovereignty, certain other factors also attributed to the 
formation of restrictive policies. First, it wanted to give a free run to the MPT and thereby 
closed the gates of entry of FDI into China. Second, the Chinese government, like its 
counterparts in developing and transitional economies, wanted to protect the interests of the 
national domestic industry. This view is amply reflected in the work of Mueller and Tan that 
services market in telecommunication would remain restricted to foreign investors as long as 
national industrial policy and political considerations define the agenda of reforms. Third, it is 
believed that the sector did not provide a clear, predictable, and transparent environment for the 
foreign enterprises. Fourth, immediately after the accession, foreign investors were not clear 
about the timeline of the liberalisation of different services. Fifth, the MII acts as a conservative 
regulator which limits the scope of expansion in an era of openness. Sixth, they were not sure 
of their profit margins as the post accession period does not liberalize the sector in a speedy 
manner; rather it does it in a phased manner over a period of six-years. 
                                                 
27 Several studies have directly attributed to the conservative stance of China on FDI to the issue of sovereignty 
and national security. See Zhang and Peng (2000, p.14) and Xu (2002, pp. 25–26). 
28 Decree No. 20, jointly issued by MII and SDPC in February 2002. 
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Concern for national security had resulted in delaying of complete restructuring of 
telecommunications sector in China. It was kept under the tight state control and remained 
protected from foreign competition. National security and national sovereignty were of vital 
importance to the Chinese Government as articulated in the “Five Principles of Peaceful Co-
existence.” In order to ensure that these principles were abided by the Chinese domestic laws 
and rules in the telecommunications sector remained non-transparent and obscure (Kobayashi 
2007, p. 146). However, the approach to the sector began to change when China joined the 
WTO. Yet, it continues to be a major factor in opening up the sector. Like many other countries 
issue of national security in China greatly features in telecommunications market. Security is 
also adequately included as a relevant consideration in China’s telecommunications regulations 
and draft telecommunications law. Article 10 of the current regulations states: 
            When examining an application for the operation of basic telecommunications 
services, the State Council's department in charge of the information industry shall 
consider factors such as state security, telecommunications network security, the 
sustainable utilization of telecommunications resources, environmental protection 
and the state of competition in the telecommunications market.
29
 
3.3 Issue of Transparency and Regulatory Independence 
In relation to FDI coming into the sector, the major hindrance for the foreign investors was the 
issue of transparency in the regulatory system. China’s regulatory framework for 
telecommunications is relatively opaque and difficult to understand. This opacity is most acute 
for those who do not read Chinese. China agreed in its accession (via paragraph 334 of the 
Working Party Report) to ‘make available to the WTO Members translations into one or more 
of the official languages of the WTO all laws, regulations and other measures pertaining to or 
affecting trade in goods, services, TRIPS or the control of forex’, at the latest 90 days after 
implementation or enforcement of such measures. This commitment, which builds on the 
general transparency obligations in GATS and the Accession Protocol,30 has been described as 
both ‘extraordinary’31 and ‘astonishingly ambitious’,32 and the WTO Secretariat acknowledged 
improvements in regulatory transparency in China’s most recent Trade Policy Review.33 China 
                                                 
29 Telecommunications Regulations of the People’s Republic of China, State Council Decree No 291(promulgated 
and effective 25 September 2000) art 12, as translated in TransAsia Lawyers, China’s IT & Telecoms Legislation 
(Vol. III) (TransAsia, 2003), p. 285. 
30 GATS, Art III; Accession Protocol, Section 2C. 
31  Julia Qin, ‘“WTO-Plus” Obligations and Their Implications for the World Trade Organization Legal System: 
An Appraisal of the China Accession Protocol’ (2003) 37(3) Journal of World Trade, p. 483, 494. 
32 Donald Clarke, ‘China’s Legal System and the WTO: Prospects for Compliance’ (2003) 2 Washington 
University Global Studies Law Review p. 97, 113. 
33 WTO Trade Policy Review Body, Trade Policy Review: Report by the Secretariat – China, 
WT/TPR/S/199/Rev.1 (12 August 2008), p. 24, 29. The WTO’s Trade Policy Review Body conducts periodic 
evaluations of each WTO Member’s ‘trade policies and practices and their impact on the functioning of the 
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moved from rank 41 to rank 38 out of 48 countries in the 2009 Opacity Index, which measures 
corruption, legal system inadequacies, economic enforcement policies, accounting standards 
and corporate governance, and regulation.34  
One of the key challenges facing the government is the regulatory independence. Regulatory 
independence essentially would mean the independence from the government, industry lobby 
and from the consumers; essentially reflecting structural and functional independence. China 
claims that its telecommunications service sector enjoys regulatory independence since 1998 
when it established MII and which got subsequently replaced by MIIT in 2008. It has been 
‘structurally and financially’ separate from all telephone operators and providers which was the 
precondition of the Reference paper in telecommunications which China had signed as a part of 
its requirement to join the WTO. However, the distinction between independence from 
operators and independence from government remains blurred when the operators are State-
owned, as is typically the case in China’s telecommunications service industry. China has 
identified telecommunications as one of seven ‘strategically important’ sectors or ‘key’ 
industry that must remain under the State control.35 So much so that when an operator wishes to 
obtain a license to supply basic telecommunications services (BTS) he/she must ‘be a lawfully 
established company that specializes in basic telecommunications services and in which the 
state’s equity interest or shareholding is not less than 51%’.36 China’s BTS market is almost 
entirely occupied by three major suppliers (all offering both fixed line and mobile services and 
all State-owned): China Mobile Communications Corporation (China Mobile), China 
Telecommunications Corporation (China Telecom), and China United Network 
Communications Group Co. Ltd (China Unicom). The State shareholding in these companies is 
held by the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission and not by MIIT. 
However, both thee government outfits namely, SASAC and MIIT remain intimately involved 
in the suppliers’ operations.37 
In addition, telecom tariffs also remain strictly under the influence of the Central government. 
There is no uniform market driven tariff plan in China unlike developing countries like India. It 
changes from region to other parts of the country. There are mainly three types of tariffs:  
                                                                                                                    
multilateral trading system’: Trade Policy Review Mechanism, LT/UR/A-3/TPR/1(signed 15 April 1994, entered 
into force 1 January 1995) [A(i)]. 
34 Milken Institute, Opacity Index 2009: Measuring Global Risks (April 2009) 1, 3. See also ‘Selling foreign goods 
in China: Impenetrable’, The Economist (15 October 2009). 
35 WTO Trade Policy Review Body, Trade Policy Review: Report by the Secretariat – China, 
WT/TPR/S/199/Rev.1 (12 August 2008) 
36 Telecommunications Regulations of the People’s Republic of China, State Council Decree No 291 (promulgated 
and effective 25 September 2000) art 10, as translated in TransAsia Lawyers, China’s IT & Telecoms Legislation 
(Vol III) (TransAsia, 2003),p. 284. 
37 See generally Barry Naughton, ‘Top-Down Control: SASAC and the Persistence of State Ownership in China’, 
paper presented at China and the World Economy conference, University of Nottingham (23 June 2006). 
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government set, government guided, and market adjusted.38  For example, the MIIT sets tariff 
caps for fixed-line domestic, international long-distance telephony, and mobile domestic 
roaming.39  Tariffs for different telecom services vary significantly by region due to economic 
conditions and users' ability to pay.  The current regulatory framework for telecom tariffs 
includes:  Measures on the Approval and Filing Procedure of Telecommunication Tariff, the 
Catalogue of Telecommunications Tariffs Subject to Market-adjusted Prices, and the Catalogue 
of Telecommunications Tariffs Administered by Provincial Communications Administration 
Authorities.  The Regulations on Telecommunication stipulate that, where there is "adequate 
competition", prices of telecom services must be determined by the market.  Tariffs for value-
added services, and services where there is "sufficient market competition" 40  have been 
liberalized gradually since 2002. All these developments considerably indicate the influence of 
the Chinese Government in handling the entire telecommunications service sector to a great 
extent and it is her own wish that kept the sector so restricted even now. 
4. SUMMARY 
China’s telecommunications sector has undergone a sea-change since its accession process 
began. Fundamental changes took place in its structural as well as functional areas. From 
functioning as a wing of the Government, it went on to introduce market reforms thus 
institutionalising the distinct identity and functioning of regulators and service providers. The 
sector has remained a strategic sector as it contributed both to the manufacturing as well as 
service segments of the economy. With the joining of the WTO its strategic importance has 
increased because of the global connectivity and the issues of national security and sovereignty. 
China’s GATS commitments symbolize a major initiative towards telecommunications 
liberalisation. Within a period of six years from the date of accession, i.e., by the end of 2007, it 
promised to lift all forms of restrictions as far as market access to its territory is concerned. 
This is an encouraging sign for the trading partners who are all waiting and genuinely interested 
in establishing and nurturing a continuous trading relationship with China. By and large the 
                                                 
38 Details of the government-set and government-guided tariffs administered by the Central Government are 
provided in the Catalogue of the National Development and Planning Commission and the State Council on 
Ministerial Pricing (Decree No. 11 of the National Development and Planning Commission).  The Notice on 
Implementing the Market Adjusted Pricing for Part of the Telecommunication Business provides information 
regarding market adjusted tariffs. 
39 In March 2008, China lowered calling charges on domestic roaming of mobile telephone from Yuan 1.3-1.5 per 
minute to no higher than Yuan 0.6 per minute, and called charges from about Y 1.3-1.5 per minute to no higher 
than Yuan 0.4 per minute.  Tariff caps are Yuan 0.07/6 seconds for domestic long-distance telephony, and 
Yuan 0.8/6 seconds for international long-distance telephony (for outgoing calls to the Hong Kong and Macao 
SARs, and Chinese Taipei, the tariff cap is Yuan 0.2/6 seconds).  Various provinces have different ceilings for call 
charges within the operating range of local wired telephone networks, ranging from Yuan 0.18 per minute to 
Yuan 0.3 per minute.  Single-direction charging of mobile telephone business, in which the called numbers are not 
charged, has been implemented within the business range to which the calling numbers belong, equivalent to the 
range of a local wired telephone network. 
40 Trade Policy review China 2010, available at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/tpr_e/s230-04_e.doc 
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commitments have allowed China to accrue gains in terms of providing employment, 
improving the service base, satisfying a wide range of consumers’ needs and helping in 
registering high economic growth. Signs of improvement have begun to show as it opened up 
the sector with some restrictions. 
Through process of phase wise liberalisation, it has increased its domestic consumer base by 
providing connectivity to many regions of the country and also remaining connected to the 
outside world. The industry also witnessed a sustained growth in its size since reforms began in 
the sector. The total value of telecom business services had soared from RMB 1.9 billion in 
1978 to around 1.85 trillion in 2007 to approximately 2.5 trillion in 2010 (China Statistical 
Yearbook, 2008 and 2011).  
The ongoing global financial crisis and global economic meltdown have not affected the sector 
in a major way. As a strategic and futuristic sector, it has the potential to grow. The 
telecommunications sector in China is set to prosper as more and more businesses are expected 
to employ more sophisticated telecom services.  
In the long run, China’s telecom industry will develop into an information service industry. It 
will constantly endeavour to improve its quality which can compete with service providers in 
developed countries. It will aim to provide quality, reliable, safe and diverse information 
services to the Government and to all sections of the society. As restrictions have been 
withdrawn, international players are allowed to operate in China. Vodafone is currently 
entering into an arrangement with China Mobile to provide services. This would infuse a sense 
of competition among the Chinese service providers. Such competition will lead to form an 
industrial chain for the coordinated development of all market players. This will help promote 
economic growth. Many experts believe that with an efficient regulatory system in place, many 
business brands with indigenous intellectual property rights (IPR) will enter the market. The 
Chinese telecom service providers will become more competitive in the overseas markets and 
will create a secure market for themselves as China has done in other sectors like hardware, 
electrical machinery, textiles, toys, etc. (Yong, 2009: Personal Interview).  
Today, high barriers to foreign entrants in the telecommunications service sector, have 
indicated that many potential entrants and even the WTO would concede that China have 
marginally kept to the agreed schedule for phasing out WTO commitments in the 
telecommunications sector. If China’s current approach to telecommunications regulation 
proves not only impervious to reform but also legal under WTO rules, WTO Members will 
have all the more reason to ensure that these circumstances do not arise again. 
The paper in a way highlights some of the WTO inconsistencies still persist in China. Most of 
them are associated with transparency, regulatory independence and competition. Looking at 
the commercial enormity of this sector, the US may put enough pressure on China in 
strengthening the GATS discipline in terms of transparency and regulatory independence. The 
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future uncertainty of the sector will also force members of the WTO to freshly look at telecom 
industry in China by revisiting the China’s GATS commitments. Because China’s GATS 
commitments were projected upon its WTO accession as a getaway to genuine market access 
for foreign services providers. Based on this expectation, many WTO members sold China’s 
accession to their domestic constituencies. 
Another important understanding from this study is that China’s telecom service sector was less 
paced out compared to its manufacturing or industrial sector. That is because when China 
wanted to integrate with the world economy it laid much emphasis on its ‘manufacturing 
sector’ knowing pretty well that its ‘core strength’ lies in manufacturing sector. As a result, it 
liberalized FDI policies initially in late 1970s and 1980s at rapid pace. The sector received 
‘State Patronage’ whereas services sector was put into an ‘Experimental Use’ or opened out in 
a gradual and phased manner. 
The Government in China is currently facing another significant challenge as the innovation in 
telecom technology is taking deep roots through 3G. Innovative services and different 
consumer requirements are forcing the industry to be more competitive. To make the market 
and industry more growth oriented and fair and equitable, a competition law needs to be in 
place. To ensure the confidence of investors in China’s telecommunications sector, and to 
ensure that China continues to develop a transparent, pro-competitive, and effective 
telecommunications industry, the Chinese government needs to take proactive measures to 
fulfill this challenging task. 
It is certain that the telecommunications sector in China is on an expansive mode. Its mobile 
and internet sectors are the largest and second fastest growing in the world. For China to remain 
largest mobile telecom user, it must focus on allowing an early entry for the foreign investors 
so that a free and fair competition can take place in the market which will be genuinely price 
competitive for the consumers. All this pose a big challenge for the current telecom regulatory 
body. To a large extent, the Government’s role and involvement will be a major determinant in 
shaping future growth of China’s telecommunications service sector. 
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Appendix 
Basic Conditions of Post and Telecommunication Services during 2001-2008 
Item 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Business Volume of 
Post and 
Telecommunication 
Service     (100 
million Yuan) 
 
4556.2
6 
5695.80 
7019.7
9 
9712.2
9 
12028.54 15325.87 19805.06 23649.52 
Number of Mobile 
Telephone 
Subscribers at Year-
end    (10 000 
subscribers) 
 
14522.
2 
20600.5 
26995.
3 
33482.
4 
39340.6 46105.8 54730.6 64124.5 
Local Telephone 
Subscribers of at 
Year-end  (10 000 
subscribers) 
 
18036.
8 
21422.2 
26274.
7 
31175.
6 
35044.5 36778.6 36563.7 34035.9 
Local (Urban) 11193. 13579.1 17109. 21025. 23975.3 25132.9 24859.8 23155.9 
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Telephone 
Subscribers at Year-
end     (10 000 
subscribers) 
 
7 7 1 
 Rural Telephones 
Subscribers at Year-
end (10 000 
subscribers) 
 
6843.1 7843.1 9165.0 
10150.
5 
11069.2 11645.6 11704.0 10880.0 
 Number of Post & 
Telecommunications 
Offices(unit) 
 
57136 76358 63555 66393 65917 62799 70655 69146 
 Length of Postal 
Routes and Rural 
Delivery Routes  (10 
000 km) 
659.53 659.22 680.20 686.70 697.15 693.64 717.05 735.00 
Source: China statistical yearbook, 2011 
